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VALUING EARLY STAGE COMPANIES
By N eil J .  B e a to n , C P A / A B V , C FA , ASA
The valuation of early-stage compa­
nies has always been a challenge 
because such engagements usually 
don’t follow “traditional” valuation 
techniques. In this article, I hope to 
provide practical help based on my 
experience so that valuation analysts 
with the requisite skills will be more 
comfortable about taking on such 
assignments.
HOW WE GOT HERE
Those of you who performed valua­
tions during the “dot.com” boom are 
familiar with the bizarre valuations 
that were prevalent then. Early-stage 
companies, meaning those with little 
or no revenue or income, were com­
manding huge valuations, sometimes 
eclipsing the market values of many 
well-established “old economy” com­
panies. Valuation professionals could 
make no mistake, while “experts” 
such as Henry Blodgett and Mary 
Meeker achieved icon status. But alas, 
reality finally set in and the bubble 
burst in March and April 2000.
Looking back at that period, I 
wonder how things got so crazy. The 
answer, I believe, lies at the core of 
valuation theory, specifically in one 
aspect of that theory: Uncertainty. 
Fundamentally, valuation profession­
als need only the following three 
basic items to value any asset:
An income stream,
A discount rate, and
A growth rate.
If one or more of those three fac­
tors are unknown or uncertain, the 
underlying valuation becomes murky. 
For early-stage companies, at least
two of the three necessary inputs are 
subject to substantial uncertainty. 
First, the income stream is sometimes 
little more than an “Excel exercise” 
based on a spreadsheet model that is 
typically built on numerous assump­
tions. Second, the growth of the 
income stream is a pure wild guess. 
The importance of the discount rate 
under these circumstances dimin­
ishes because w ithout a relevant 
income stream or growth rate, what is 
there to discount?
So, what was driving such high val­
uations in the late 1990s? Clearly, the 
Internet played a big role, but that is 
only the supply side. On the demand 
side, capital was flowing like beer at a 
frat party. In 1999 and 2000, and 
even the residual period in 2001, the 
stock market frenzy was a capital and 
business siren beckoning  both  
investor and entrepreneur to drink 
the “kool aid” of high valuations. Ini­
tial public offerings (IPOs) hit fever­
ish highs that mirrored the amounts 
capital companies were able to raise. 
Both the num ber of IPOs and the 
amount of capital raised by IPO com­
panies peaked between the last quar­
ter of 1999 and the first quarter of 
2000. Many paper m illions were 
made by thousands of new investors. 
Some were even lucky enough to sell 
off before the big crash and convert 
at least some paper profits into real 
dollars. The majority, however, were 
not as fortunate. Granting that the 
In ternet created trem endous busi­
ness potential, no one really knew 
ju s t how m uch po ten tia l. With 
investors afraid that they would “miss
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out” if they didn’t invest, uncertainty 
became the primary driver behind 
the run-up in valuations.
Returning to our three valuation 
ingredients, consider that cash flows 
were projected to increase at a phe­
nomenal pace while discount rates 
mostly continued to be drawn from 
the general marketplace. Since most 
of these companies didn’t have posi­
tive EBITDA (earnings before inter­
est, taxes, depreciation, and amorti­
zation), let alone earnings, revenue 
multiples replaced P/E (price/earn­
ings) multiples. Moreover, the mod­
era tion  in m ultiples typically 
expected  as one moves up the 
income chain (net income to rev­
enue) did not occur. Instead, new 
term s were invented to “f it” the 
absurd  valuations. A walk down 
memory lane brings to mind valua­
tion metrics such as:
• Price to employees
• Price to page views
• Price to click-throughs
• Price to downloads
• Price to PDAs
• Price to PPE
• Price to doors passed
Price to next year’s revenue
Financial metrics were lacking,
for obvious reasons. But In ternet 
companies w eren’t the only ones 
looking for valuation validation in 
the m arketplace. In frastructu re  
plays, such as com petitive local 
exchange carriers and cable compa­
nies, were being valued on the basis 
of price to property , p lan t, and 
equipment or price to subscribers. 
A lthough nonfinancia l m etrics 
weren’t new back in the late 1990s,
they broke new ground 
by becom ing the only 
metrics on many occa­
sions.
Perform ing a valua­
tion engagement for an 
early stage com pany 
requ ires a d iffe ren t 
approach than a valua­
tion engagem ent for a 
typical revenue- and 
in c o m e - g e n e r a t in g  
entity. A lack of financial 
metrics from which to 
derive value, coupled 
with intense uncertainty, mandates a 
different analytical skill set. Such 
assignments force the valuation pro­
fessional to delve further into the 
qualitative aspects of the company, 
its management team, and its market 
prospects than he or she typically 
would in a “traditional” valuation 
engagement.
GOOD JUDGMENT COMES FROM 
EXPERIENCE
Early-stage company valuations are 
typically performed for the issuance 
of common stock options, but can 
be done for other purposes as well. I 
am often asked to value an early- 
stage company for investment pur­
poses, but since most early-stage 
companies already have a modicum 
of external investment, I tend to pre­
fer to take an advisory role rather 
than conducting a formal valuation. 
In real life, the valuation of an early- 
stage company is a result of a mutu­
ally accepted valuation between the 
company and its financial backer or 
backers. The valuation incorporates
Representative Ownership Status of the 
Venture Pool
Current
Ownership Status
Number of 
Companies Percentage
Private and independent 4 ,962 85%
Out of business 559 10%
Acquired or merged 297 5%
Publicly held 22 —
In IPO registration 18 —
Total 5 ,960 100%
the entrepreneur’s determination of 
the acceptable amount of ownership 
that may be given in return for the 
investor’s capital and /o r expertise, 
and the investor’s assessment of the 
risks and rewards of the investment. 
As such, it is critical to understand 
the valuation process from the per­
spectives of both the investor and 
the company. Most early-stage com­
panies follow the same path during 
development, which is also impor­
tant.
Valuation methodologies differ 
according to the stage of investment 
and the availability of quantitative 
and qualitative data. However, the 
basic com ponents of early-stage 
company valuations are universal, 
somewhat simple, and need to be 
understood before you take on such 
an engagement. The following sec­
tions discuss how investors consider, 
construct, and justify valuations of 
early-stage com panies, and offer 
perspective on the dynamic role of 
valuation throughout a company’s 
life cycle.
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PRE-MONEY AND POST-MONEY 
VALUATIONS
Private equity deals focus on the pre­
money valuation of a company. This 
is the estimated value of the com­
pany before any external purchase 
of equity. The pre-money valuation 
of the company, combined with the 
amount of capital accepted by the 
company, determines the amount of 
equity ownership sold in exchange 
for capital. The valuation resulting 
after the investment is called the 
post-money valuation. For example, 
in a company with a pre-money value 
of $2.5 million, a $2.5 million invest­
ment would buy a 50% ownership 
stake in the company. The basic for­
mula is:
Pre-money valuation + invested capital 
= Post-money valuation
U nlike trad itional valuation 
engagements, it is just as important 
for the company to determine the 
am ount of capital it needs or will 
accept as the negotiation of the pre­
money valuation. The former deci­
sion depends on a myriad of circum­
stances, but ultimately will be driven 
by its anticipated capital needs until 
additional capital is needed or an 
estim ated liquidity  event. The 
amount of capital accepted, in turn, 
will dictate how much ownership of 
the company the owners will have to 
give up.
Figure 1. Amount Raised by Year and Round
Seed
Round
First
Round
Second
Round
Later
Round Overall Restart
Figure 2. Median Pre-Money Valuation by Stage
HOW DO VENTURE CAPITALISTS DO IT?
Like any investm ent, early-stage 
investing is far from an exact sci­
ence. An early-stage company may 
be little more than an entrepreneur 
with an idea. Valuations at this early 
“seed stage” are generally driven by 
subjective factors such as the assess­
ment of the management team, the 
com pelling na tu re  of the value 
proposition, the evaluation of intel­
lectual property, the expected time- 
to-market, the expected path to prof­
itability, estimated capital needs and 
burn rate, industry sector volatility, 
and/or deal structure. In later invest­
m ent rounds, interm ediate mile­
stones, such as events demonstrating 
technical feasibility and product vali­
dation, will factor strongly in valua-
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002
2003 
2004 
2005
tion determinations. As a company 
matures to the revenue and profit 
stage, more quantifiable data are 
produced in the form of operating 
statistics and performance indica­
tors. Actual results allow investors to 
more accurately model quarterly and 
annual revenue, EBITDA, cash burn, 
pipeline close rates, backlog, book­
ings, and enterprise valuation.
As would be expected, the devel­
opment stage of a company will also 
determine its relative value. What is 
interesting, however, is that the stage 
of a com pany also dictates the 
amount of capital it is likely to get. 
As those of us in the valuation pro­
fession are intimately aware, risk 
varies inversely with the quality and 
quantity of data. The high degree of 
uncertainty inheren t in seed and 
early-stage investments translates 
into relatively low pre-money valua­
tions. The failure rate for startup 
companies is extraordinarily high, 
and so investors must be compen­
sated for their risk. Conversely, the 
risk taken by later-stage and mezza­
nine investors is mitigated by the cer­
tainty of these later financial models. 
These investors “pay” for the 
reduced risk of their investments 
with higher pre-money valuations, 
lower step ups, and lower overall 
returns, allowing for less upside.
It is im portant to consider the 
am ount of capital raised in each 
round . As shown in Figure 1,
3
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“A m ount Raised by Year and 
Round,” seed and first-round compa­
nies are at the bottom of the capital 
pile while second and later-stage 
companies are at the top. It should 
be noted also that since the tech 
wreck, another form of financing, 
restart rounds, has begun to take on 
more prominence as companies that 
survived the wreck attempt a come­
back of sorts.
The amount of capital raised is an 
integral input into the ultimate valu­
ation model. Of note here, however, 
is the increasing amount of capital 
needed by round. Again, this obser­
vation is intuitive because companies 
in the second and later stages are 
building out their production capac­
ity and sales organizations, and 
would be expected  to need  a 
trem endous am oun t of capital. 
Another way of looking at this phe­
nomenon is from the venture capital 
(VC) perspective. Seed rounds 
received very little capital because 
most VC firms focus on first- and sec­
ond-stage companies. Since 2000, 
however, there has been a steady 
increase in the percentage of VC 
flowing into later-stage companies. 
Of course, the brutal lessons learned 
in the “tech wreck” may explain this 
movement of capital into companies 
with proven technologies.
W hat are the typical stages of 
development for early-stage compa­
nies? Although there are no stan­
dards per se, consensus usually fol­
lows the breakdowns shown in the 
chart on page 5 borrowed from the 
AICPA’s Practice Aid, The Valuation 
of Private Equity Securities Issued in 
Other Than a Business Combination. As 
set forth  in the Practice Aid, an 
enterprise may go through other 
stages that are no t in the chart. 
Some product development cycles 
include extensive prototyping dur­
ing developm ent and may have 
many more stages than shown above. 
Moreover, not every enterprise will 
go through every stage.
Valuations, of course, also vary by 
stage. Based on the data from Ven- 
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ture One, Figure 2, “Median Pre- 
Money Valuation by Stage” shows 
the relative valuations of various ven­
ture-bracket companies by stage of 
development.
As shown in the chart, continuous 
value increases are logged from 
startup through the shipping stage. 
Notice what happens in the prof­
itable stage: The valuations are only 
slightly higher than in the shipping 
stage (except in 2000, when they 
were lower). Going back to our dis­
cussion of value creation, this mod­
est value increase at the profitable 
stage compared with the shipping 
stage can be traced to perception 
and decreased uncertainty. At the 
shipping stage, the ultimate prof­
itability of the com pany is still 
unknown, so valuations still contain 
a large dose of uncertainty. However, 
once profitability is demonstrated 
and margins can be predicted with 
more accuracy, the uncertainty of 
future prospects is diminished, lead­
ing to more conservative valuations 
based on more realistic forecasts. 
Venture capitalists are no longer will­
ing to pay for unknow n fu tu re  
prospects at the profitable stage if 
those prospects are not expected to 
exceed their former expectations.
THE INCOME APPROACH AS AN 
OXYMORON
Venture capitalists review thousands 
of business plans each year. Most of 
them include aggressive revenue and 
income growth assumptions and a 
rosy picture of the competitive land­
scape. Many of these forecasts claim 
to be predicated on “conservative 
assum ptions,” including minimal 
market penetration, product pricing, 
and gross margin. Regardless of how 
the predictions are constructed, 
however, they are alm ost always 
overoptimistic in their assumptions. 
Often, when I revisit the operating 
results of many early-stage compa­
nies that I had valued in previous 
years, I have found that, with rare 
exceptions, the ir forecasts were 
proven to be wildly optimistic on the
expense side, if not in revenues. A 
venture investor will usually “scrub 
the num bers,” rationalize assump­
tions, and run sensitivities based on 
varying degrees of execution, com­
petitive pricing pressure, seasonality, 
and so fo rth . The resu lting  
“adjusted” forecast may represent 
only a fraction of the original plan. 
Appraisers often encounter difficulty 
in ascertaining the validity of fore­
cast assumptions, especially related 
to unique technology or a novel 
drug. Consequently, in the absence 
of doing our own “scrubbing,” we 
must address this uncertainty in the 
discount rate.
Despite the difficulty of assessing 
forecast validity, adjustments can be 
m ade based on m anagem ent 
inquiry. For example, significantly 
greater capital requirements may be 
necessary. Appraisers must under­
stand the short- and long-term capi­
tal requirements of the subject com­
pany. The capital requirements will 
provide the underp inning  of the 
company’s long-term financing strat­
egy and answer the questions: How 
much must be raised now? When 
will the company need to “go to the 
well” again? What significant mile­
stones will be accomplished during 
that time? An understanding of the 
long-term financing strategy is cru­
cial. The median time needed to 
secure financing has been creeping 
up over the past few years. A slight 
decrease was experienced at the end 
of 2004 and into 2005 as the VC capi­
tal overhang (that is, the amount of 
capital committed to venture funds) 
remained historically high, and, cou­
pled with an improving world econ­
omy, stimulated new investment.
An important relationship to note 
when valuing early-stage companies 
is the relationship between the post­
money valuation as determined in a 
venture investment and the intrinsic 
market valuation of the enterprise 
that might be realized in a sale of the 
company at the time of that invest­
ment. The implied pre-money valua­
tions of the seed and Series A invest-
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Stages of a Company's Development
STAGE DESCRIPTION
1 The enterprise has no product revenue to date, a limited expense his­
tory, and, typically, an incomplete management team with an idea, plan, 
and possibly some initial product development. Typically, seed capital or 
first-round financing is provided during this stage by friends and family, 
angels, or venture capital firms focusing on early-stage enterprises, and 
the securities issued to those investors occasionally take the form of 
common stock but are more commonly preferred stock.
2  The enterprise has no product revenue but substantive expense his­
tory, as product development is under way, and business challenges 
are thought to be understood. Typically, a second or third round of 
financing occurs during this stage. Typical investors are venture capi­
tal firms, which may provide additional management or boards of direc­
tors’ expertise. The typical securities issued to those investors are in 
the form of preferred stock.
3  The enterprise has made significant progress in product development; 
key development milestones have been met (for example, the hiring of 
a management team); and development is near completion (for exam­
ple, alpha and beta testing), but generally there is no product revenue. 
Typically, later rounds of financing occur during this stage. Typical 
investors are venture capital firms and strategic business partners. 
The typical securities issued to those investors are in the form of pre­
ferred stock.
4 The enterprise has met additional key development milestones (for 
example, first customer orders, first revenue shipments) and has some 
product revenue, but is still operating at a loss. Typically, mezzanine 
rounds of financing occur at this stage. Also, it is frequently in this 
stage that discussions would start with investment banks for an IPO.
5  The enterprise has product revenue and has recently achieved break­
through measures of financial success such as operating profitability 
or breakeven or positive cash flows. A liquidity event of some sort, 
such as an IPO or a sale of the enterprise, could occur at this stage. 
The form of securities issued is typically all common stock, with any 
outstanding preferred converting to common upon an IPO (and perhaps 
also upon other liquidity events).
6  The enterprise has an established financial history of profitable opera­
tions or generation of positive cash flows. An IPO could also occur dur­
ing this stage.
ments usually exceed the market val­
uations at the time of those invest­
ments, based upon sales of compa­
nies in these two stages. This is 
intuitive since the VCs are “betting” 
on the company ahead of the mar­
ket. This early-value premium results 
from the VCs’ application of qualita­
tive data derived from their collec­
tive experience or “gut” about the
prospects of the company. The ven­
ture investor is valuing company 
in tangib les, such as its idea or 
human capital; the market may not 
even recognize, let alone be willing 
to pay for such intangibles. As the 
company matures and moves into its 
Series B financing, pre-money valua­
tions fall in relation to market value. 
Interim valuations are still generally
below m arket value, but the gap 
closes considerably. This affords 
Series B and later investors a risk 
premium in valuation to compensate 
for the illiquid nature of private 
equity, even though much of the 
technological risk has been sated.
VALUATION STRATEGIES
The foregoing is the risk and return 
perspective of a VC. But what about 
the company’s return perspective? 
What does a company have to give 
up in exchange for the funds a VC is 
willing to commit? The answer, of 
course, is equity, and many times 
with a capital E! Ordinarily, each 
financing round is designed to pro­
vide capital for value-creating objec­
tives. (This premise is violated only 
on those occasions when capital is 
committed to “save” a company from 
an untimely failure until market or 
other conditions improve. Assuming 
operating goals are accomplished 
and value is created, financing will 
continue at sequentially higher valu­
ations com m ensurate with the 
progress made and risk mitigated.
What percentage of their compa­
nies do entrepreneurs “give up” in 
exchange for each financing round? 
The clear trend from 1998 through 
2003 (the latest available data) is that 
investors are now requiring more 
equity at each round for a given level 
of investment than they have over 
the past five years. The patterns are 
interesting, however. The amount of 
give-up at the first round is 48%. 
Entrepreneurs are giving up almost 
half of their companies compared 
with the overall average of only 29%. 
Nonetheless, the relationships across 
rounds are fairly consistent with the 
greatest give-up at the first round, 
followed by the second round, and 
then  the seed and later rounds. 
Although no definitive explanation 
for this phenomenon is given in the 
literature, I deduce that because the 
amount invested at the first stage is 
relatively greater than typical seed 
rounds, and technological and mar­
ket risk dem ons are still lurking
5
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aro u n d  every co rner, investors 
require a much greater amount of 
equity to compensate for the risk. At 
any rate, it is from these investment 
and give-up relationships that the 
appraiser can frame initial valuation 
conclusions.
So, how does one go about valuing 
a company with no revenue and many 
times no im m ediate short-term  
prospects for positive cash flow? One 
way is to look at the relationship of 
investment, give-up, and company 
stage of development. Assuming the 
company has “legs,” that is, it has 
demonstrated or perceived potential 
beyond a mere idea, the appraiser can 
look to information similar to that 
provided in the foregoing sections.
An example is helpful. Suppose 
you are provided with the business 
plan of a seed-stage company that is 
looking for $750,000 to prove techni­
cal feasibility of its software product, 
a new spreadsheet that will focus on 
the emerging DNA sequencing mar­
ket. The business plan calls for an 
additional $1.5 million in capital 
needed in 12 months for the build­
out of a sales force and management 
team. So far, the company has been 
funded by friends and family to the 
tune of $250,000. The m ajority 
shareholder and founder believes 
the company is worth $5 million, but 
has no empirical support for that 
value. What’s the value?
The question seems unfair, 
because the information is so scant, 
but that is often the case. So, given 
this information, what would I do? 
First, since it’s a seed-stage company, 
I ’d look to the median values for 
seed-stage companies and see that 
they came in around $2.5 million in 
the last few years. That’s one data 
point. I also know that the average 
give-up for seed-stage companies is 
27%. So, if the com pany gets 
$750,000, its implied value is $2.8 
million [$750,000 ÷ 27% = $2.8 mil­
lion]. That’s a second data point. 
However, I also “know” that the com­
pany will need an additional $1.5 mil­
lion in a year to meet its expansion 
6
plans and achieve its revenue targets. 
But I also know the average length of 
time to obtain follow-up financing is 
between 15 and 20 months. Finally, I 
know the step-up in value between 
the seed and the first round is about 
20 times the starting value. With all 
of this, we can vector in to a value 
between $1.25 million and $1.75 mil­
lion, pre-money. Of course, it helps 
to have seen hundreds of business 
plans and early-stage companies, 
which has given me a sense of where 
this particular company and manage­
ment team fit in. It is also instructive 
to look at overall valuations com­
pared with the amount of external 
funds a company has raised during 
its buildout.
From 1992 through 1996 (before 
the bubble began to inflate), the 
am ount of capital a com pany 
needed to raise approximated 20% 
of its ultimate liquidity value. Then, 
du ring  the bubble, from  1997 
through the first quarter of 2000, the 
“liquidity percentage” dropped to 
around 10%. After the bubble burst, 
however, the pendulum swung back 
hard and high with the liquidity per­
centage peaking at 25% and since 
then settling back above 20%. Indus­
try participants believe these ratios 
are here to stay; most VCs do not 
expect the excesses of the Internet 
bubble to reappear in any of our life­
times. This relationship becomes a 
solid benchm ark  from  which to 
assess the reasonableness of a partic­
ular company’s value at a particular 
point in time.
As m entioned briefly, since the 
tech wreck in 2000, restarts are a 
form of financing that has become 
more prevalent. Restarts typically 
occur when a company has encoun­
tered unforeseen hurdles that have 
momentarily derailed the implemen­
tation  of its business p lan . The 
underlying fundamentals of the busi­
ness remain, but the timing to mar­
ket may have been off. Under these 
circumstances, historical results lose 
their relevance, making way for a 
new set of milestones to which future
results will be com pared. Restart 
financings are also known as “flat 
rounds” or “down rounds” in which 
a valuation is reduced . A down 
round can result from prem ature 
capital shortages from overspending, 
failure to achieve value-creating 
milestones, or suboptimal operating 
performance. The overpricing of a 
prior financing (as occurred during 
the Internet bubble) or softening 
capital markets (as occurred after 
the bubble burst) may also play a 
role in a flat or down round. Down 
rounds are undesirable—they trig­
ger dilution and they underm ine 
investor confidence. They also bring 
unwanted writedowns to venture 
investors’ portfolios, if they take 
them. Nonetheless, some restarts 
have succeeded after going through 
a down round. I have taken engage­
ments that concern lawsuits involv­
ing restarts in which the prior equity 
holders were “eliminated” in a down 
round only to see “their” company 
become successful under the tute­
lage of and with additional capital 
from follow-on investors.
A lthough the valuation of an 
early-stage com pany at d iscrete 
points in time is subject to a certain 
range of interpretation, most sea­
soned venture investors and apprais­
ers value a company within the same 
fairly tigh t range if they have 
exhausted all the available quantita­
tive and qualitative data. It is difficult 
to explain why, but the empirical 
data clearly show a fairly tight range 
of values for companies in a particu­
lar stage of investment. In the end, 
the minutiae of valuation will matter 
very little to a company with a solid 
product and market potential. Valua­
tion can make a good investment 
more attractive, but it will not salvage 
a poor one. A company will usually 
receive several financings, and there­
fore several valuations, before a liq­
uidity event is accomplished. Build­
ing value is the shared objective of 
entrepreneur and investor. A mutual 
understanding between investor and 
e n tre p re n e u r  of the risks and
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rewards driving a valuation is crucial 
to the ultimate success of the com­
pany and its investors.
THE PRESENT PICTURE
So where does all this leave us today? 
Clearly, venture investment in early 
stage companies is here to stay, solid­
ifying the need for early-stage com­
pany valuations. VCs had more than 
$53 billion available to invest as of 
March 31, 2005. Clearly, 2004 was a 
turnaround year for VC capital rais­
ing at $12.9 billion. The first quarter
of 2005 indicates that 2005 will be on 
pace with 2004, boding well for the 
industry.
Another characteristic that pro­
vides insights into the early-stage 
company world is the ownership 
structure of typical venture pools. As 
shown in the table on page 2, the vast 
majority of venture-backed compa­
nies are privately held entities, while 
the next largest category is compa­
nies that have gone out of business. 
These two categories account for 
more than 85% of all venture-backed
companies! So although we hear of 
the media grabbing winners like e- 
bay and Google, the vast majority of 
venture-backed companies toil in rel­
ative obscurity looking for the kiss 
from the IPO prince.
Still, don ’t forget: There is no 
perfect m ethod for valuing high 
risk, long-term investments. First 
and foremost, investors look for a 
quality management team and then 
consider the prospects for the com­
pany. Only then will valuation be 
addressed. X
A PRIMER IN VALUING CLOSELY HELD 
COMPANIES USING THE MARKET 
APPROACH AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Not All Variables and Industries Are Created Equal
By Ja m e s  A. D iG a b rie le , D P S , CPA
Valuation analysts who rely on a mar­
ket approach to value a closely held 
company (that is, the guideline com­
pany method or direct market data 
method) may find themselves calcu­
lating a myriad of pricing ratios. The 
ratios may include sales price to 
sales, sale price to asset, and so on, 
inevitably resulting in a range of val­
ues for the subject company. The 
most commonly used method is to 
simply take the arithm etic mean 
(average) of the multiple of the ana­
lyst’s choice and apply it to the sub­
ject company to obtain a value.
Nevertheless, this approach has a 
num ber of drawbacks. The arith­
metic mean is a useful measure of 
central tendency for everyday use. 
However, because it considers every 
single value in the data set, the aver­
age can become problematic. For 
example, if most of the numbers in a 
data set are comparatively related 
and few of them are not, this causes 
the average to be biased to an out­
lier.
The following is a simple illustra­
tion of this concept: A group of fish­
erman went fishing for a month and 
logged the fish that each fisherman 
caught. To determine the average 
number of fish caught by this group, 
we have the following data:
Table 1
Name Number of Fish
Bill 300
Mike 250
Rick 220
Herb 260
Andy 1,468
Average 499 .6
Clearly, one value differs signifi­
cantly from all of the other values. 
But more important, that value dis­
torts the results of the average. The 
average of the first four fishermen is 
258 fish caught. A ndy’s results 
skewed the average significantly. If 
we are working with a large data set, 
we may dismiss an outlier by ignor­
ing it since its influence may not be 
so significant. This is usually not the
case, however, in obtaining market 
data on privately held companies. 
The most logical next step is to con­
sider a method that removes most of 
the subjectivity associated with using 
the arithmetic mean, which is regres­
sion analysis.
Regression analysis is a statistical 
tool for the investigation of relation­
ships between variables. Regression 
analysis seeks to discover the causal 
effect of one variable upon another. 
In the case of valuation, the relation­
ship of sales price and gross sales 
may serve as a base for a reliable pre­
diction in a particular industry.
This article is a primer on using 
regression analysis and the market 
approach in valuing closely held 
companies. The scope of this article 
does not extend beyond the applica­
tion of the forecasting mechanics of 
regression analysis with some diag­
nostic considerations. This article is 
organized into two sections:
1. Market data and regression analy­
sis, which provides examples of 
using regression analysis in the 
process of valuing entities in two 
different industries.
2. A concluding summary of the arti­
cle that includes guidance.
MARKET DATA AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The data for this analysis were 
obtained from Pratt’s Stats™ Private 
Transaction Database. This database 
contains data described as guideline 
company, comparable sales data,
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and/or market data. The data found 
in Pratt’s Stats™ are used in the mar­
ket approach to valuing a business to 
determine a business’s fair market 
value or to perform financial research 
on the pricing of similar companies. 
The assumptions for sample statistical 
power for the following examples are 
that each example meets the general 
rule of five observations for each 
independent variable.
The first subject company used to 
illustrate the market approach and 
regression analysis is a hypothetical 
accounting firm with the following 
financial information:
• Annual Fees..................$2,100,000
• Total Assets......................$200,000
• Net Cash Flow.................$210,000
A multivariate regression analysis
was performed using a hierarchical 
regression m ethod. This sounds 
more intimidating than it is. The 
methodology is to simply enter each 
variable in a step format in the statis­
tical software. For this analysis, the 
statistical software package used was 
SPSS. Many add-on m odules for 
Microsoft Excel can accomplish the 
same task. The selection order of 
each variable is usually based upon 
the valuation analyst’s theoretical 
experience. For example, a valuation 
analyst may have prior experience in 
a particular industry and understand 
that gross sales are better value dri­
vers in the industry than net income.
Therefore, gross sales would be 
entered first in that model. The ulti­
mate reason for hierarchical regres­
sion is to evaluate each model sepa­
rately to determine the best fitting. 
The results are illustrated in Table 2.
To easily interpret the results, we 
can look to the R2 column. (See the 
sidebar entitled “Definitions for Mul­
tiple Regression Analysis” for defini­
tions of other terms and symbols.) 
This value tells us how much of the 
variability in the value of the account­
ing firm can be explained by sales, 
total assets, and cash flow. Convert­
ing the R2 values to percentages 
(multiply by 100), sales accounts for 
90% of the variability in value; sales
Table 2: Accounting Firms
Model 1  Value (Y) = Bo (Constant) + B1 (Sales)
Model 2 Value (Y) = Bo (Constant) + B1 (Sales) + B2 (Total Assets)
Model 3 Value (Y) = Bo (Constant) + B1 (Sales) + B2 (Total Assets) + B3 Cash(Flow)
Model r2 F Ratio Significance Durbin-Watson
1 0.90 165.6 0 .001
2 0.95 157.9 0 .001
3 0.97 147.1 0.001 1 .695
Table 3: Model Coefficients
Model B t Significance Tolerance VIF
1  (Constant) -6 2 0 3 6 8 6 4 .0 0 -1 .3 7 8 0 .185
Sales 3 .3 11 12 .868 0 .001 1 .000 1 .000
2 (Constant) -1 0 8 8 5 2 2 .0 0 -0 .3 0 3 0 .7 65
Sales 1 .855 4 .4 71 0 .001 0.212 4 .714
Total Assets 0 .475 3 .953 0 .0 01 0 .212 4 .714
3 (Constant) -7 6 3 3 8 9 .0 0 -0 .2 6 0 0 .798
Sales 0 .2 31 0 .332 0 .744 0 .550 18 .206
Total Assets 0 .877 4 .867 0 .0 01 0.069 14 .559
Cash Flow 10 .772 2.712 0 .015 0 .258 3 .877
Table 4: Durable Goods Wholesaler
Model 1  Value (Y) = Bo (Constant) + B1 (Sales)
Model 2 Value (Y) = Bo (Constant) + B1 (Sales) + B2 (Net Income)
Model 3 Value (Y) = Bo (Constant) + B1 (Sales) + B2 (Net Income) + B3 (Total Assets)
Model r2 F Ratio Significance Durbin-Watson
1 0.42 9 .90 0 .007
2 0.91 65 .39 0 .0 01
3 0.99 170.80 0 .001 3 .00
Table 5: Model Coefficients
Model B t Significance Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) 47 22 16 8 .00 0 .9 21 0 .373
Sales 0.174 3 .153 0 .007 1 .000 1 .000
2 (Constant) 289594 .00 0 .134 0 .895
Sales 0.060 2 .284 0 .040 0 .735 1 .361
Net Income 17 .363 8 .430 0 .0 01 0 .735 1 .361
3 (Constant) -5 2 7 6 3 5 .0 0 -0 .4 6 4 0 .6 51
Sales -0 .3 8 8 -5 .0 7 0 0 .001 0 .024 42 .105
Net Income 2.735 1 .019 0 .328 0 .119 8.429
Total Assets 2 .386 5.951 0 .001 0 .0 15 66 .288
and net assets account for 95% of the 
variability in value; and sales, net 
assets, and cash flow account for 97% 
of the variability in the value of the 
accounting firm. The F ratio tells us 
the ratio of improvement in predic­
tion that results from fitting the 
model. The change for the F ratio is 
noted at each level by adding new 
independent variables. Each level 
indicates the F ratio is statistically sig­
nificant and, therefore, it is very
8
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Definitions for Multiple 
Regression Analysis
Arithmetic mean: This is the quan­
tity commonly called the average.
B coefficients: Also referred to as 
the regression coefficients, these 
represent the independent contri­
butions of each independent vari­
ab le  to  th e  p re d ic tio n  of th e  
dependent variable.
C entra l tendency: M easures of 
central tendency are measures of 
the location of the middle or the  
center of a distribution.
Durbin-Watson Statistic: This mea­
sures th e  co rre la tio n  b etw een  
residuals.
F  Ratio: This compares the fit of 
two equations.
H ie ra rc h ic a l R e g res s io n :  This  
regression enters on an indepen­
dent (predictor) variable at a time 
to  see how each  variab le  con­
tributes to explaining the variance.
Multicolinearity: This refers to lin­
ear correlation among variables.
Multiple Regression Analysis: This 
method is used to predict the level 
or magnitude of a dependent vari­
able based on the levels of more 
than one independent variable.
R2: This is the square of the corre­
la tion  c o e ffic ie n t b etw een  th e  
dependent variable and indepen­
dent variab les , or eq u iva len tly  
defined as the ratio of regression 
variance to total variance; in other 
w ords, it  is th e  p ro po rtio n  of 
explained variation between the  
dependent and independent vari­
ables.
T-Statistic: For the independent 
variables, this is equal to the coef­
ficient estimates divided by their 
respective standard errors.
Variance In fla tio n  F ac to r (V IF )  
and Tolerance: These tw o m ea­
sures guide in identifying multico­
linearity.
unlikely that the value of the F ratio 
happened by chance. The higher the 
F ratio the better. The R2 values and 
the F ratio are both useful for sum­
marizing the overall model. Remem­
ber, R2 is the proportion of explained 
variation between the dependent 
and independent variables and the F 
ratio measures the improvement of 
one model to another.
The example added the Durbin- 
Watson statistic, which tests whether 
adjacent residuals are correlated 
(serial correlation). This is impor­
tant because theoretically, the resid­
ual terms should be uncorrelated or 
independent.
Model 2 Value (Y) = Bo (Constant) + B1 (Sales) + B2 (Total Assets)
Subject Company:
A. Annual Fees $2 ,100 ,000
B. Total Assets $200 ,000
Value (Y) = Bo +
-1 0 8 8 5 2 2
2 ,9 01 ,97 8 .00  (1 ,088 ,522 .00 )
A conservative rule of thumb is 
values of less than 1 or greater than 
3 are cause for concern. Our level of 
1.695 is within the safety range. 
Table 3 illustrates the model coeffi­
cients and includes colinearity diag­
nostics.
The B coefficients are the values 
that will ultimately produce the mar­
ket value of the accounting firm in 
the regression equation. The t-statis­
tic tests if the B values are making a 
significant co n trib u tio n  to the 
model. In other words, the t-statistic 
tests the null hypothesis that the B 
values are zero. Therefore, if it is sig­
nificant (p<.05), we accept that the B 
value is significantly different from 
zero and making a significant contri­
bution to the model.
The tolerance and VIF statistics 
are included to test if there is colin­
earity in the data. Mutlicolinearity is 
defined as when two or more inde­
pendent variables are highly corre­
lated with one another. The rule of 
thumb is that tolerance values less 
than .2 and VIF values greater than
10 are causes for concern. In this 
case, model 1 is fine; model 2 is also 
within the range. However, model 3 
has a multicolinearity problem. As a 
result, model 3 will not be consid­
ered in the final analysis of model 
selection.
Considering that model 1 and 
model 2 meet all of the criteria for 
selection to use in our regression, for 
this analysis model 2 was selected 
despite the fact that the F ratio was 
slightly lower than model 1. The rea­
son is that the R2 is higher. After this 
analysis, the value of our subject 
company can be computed using the 
following equation:
B1
2,100 ,000
1 .855
3 ,895 ,500 .00
+ b2 
200 ,000  
0 .475  
95 ,000 .00
The value of the subject company 
accounting firm, using the market 
approach and regression analysis, is 
$2,901,978. In the data for account­
ing firms, sales and total assets are 
considered good predictors of value. 
Value drivers may be different for dif­
ferent industries. In the next exam­
ple, we will look at that concept.
O ur new subject company is a 
durable goods wholesaler. The finan­
cial information for the company is 
as follows:
• Gross Sales.................$10,000,000
• Total Assets.....................$230,000
• Net Cash Flow ............. $4,000,000
Using the market approach and
regression analysis, we get the results 
shown in Table 4 and Table 5.
Because we went into detail with 
the first multiple regression analysis, 
we will limit our discussion here to 
the results. In this analysis, the bivari­
ate model, just including sales, only 
accounts for 42% of the variability in 
the value of the durable goods whole­
saler that can be explained by sales. 
The addition of net income and total
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assets, the R2 increased to .91 and 
.99. The F ratio increases with every 
step in the model and the Durbin 
Watson value is right at the end of 
the range of safety. The t statistics for 
all of the independent variables were 
significant except for net income in 
model 3. However, when evaluating 
the models, multicolinearity has pre­
sented itself in model 3. In view of 
that and the fact the R2 for model 
num ber 2 is .91, this m odel was 
selected for the calculation of value.
Bearing in mind the previously 
illustrated multiple regression equa­
tion, the value of our subject durable 
goods wholesaler is as follows:
Value (Y) = Bo
289594 .00
4 ,8 83 ,08 4  289 ,594
The value of the second subject 
company, using the market approach 
and regression analysis, is $4,883,084.
Expert RESOURCES
The following are a few  resources accessible on Web sites that may be 
helpful to expert witnesses.
PERSONAL INJURIES:
THE ECONOMIC COSTS
On April 18, 2006, the Center for 
Disease C ontrol and Prevention 
(CDC) released findings of a com­
prehensive analysis of the economic 
costs of injuries to date. The study 
used 2000 data to update  and 
expand a 1989 Report to Congress. 
The new data and findings were 
released in the book The Incidence 
and Economic Burden of Injuries 
(Oxford University Press, 2006). 
Although the main purpose of the 
report is to help government form 
appropriate public policies for pre­
venting injuries, it may be helpful to 
practitioners engaged to calculate 
costs related to personal injuries. The
In this industry, the variables played 
different parts in driving the value of 
the company. For example, in the 
accounting  industry, gross fees 
(sales) were a significant driver of 
value at an R2 of .90 in the bivariate 
m odel. However, for the second 
company in the durable wholesale 
goods industry, gross sales R2 value 
only accounted for 42% of the vari­
ability in value. Further, the variables 
in model number 2 for both subject 
companies also differed. Net income 
provided a better fit in the durable 
wholesale goods industry, extending 
the point of this article that different 
industries may require different vari­
ables that drive value when the mar­
ket approach is considered to value a 
closely held company.
+ B1 + B2
10 ,000 ,000  230 ,000
0 .06 17 .36
600 ,000  3 ,993 ,490
rep o rt considers the m edical 
expenses and productivity losses 
including lost wages, fringe benefits, 
and ability to perform normal house­
hold responsibilities related to a vari­
ety of injuries. More information 
about the book is available at the 
CDC’s  Web site (www.cdc.gov/injury) .
LAWYERS' SEVEN DEADLY 
SINS
Sometimes CPA expert witnesses 
struggle with lawyers who don’t truly 
understand the expert’s role, the 
professional standards the expert 
must comply with when providing 
services, as well as the court’s expec­
tations of the expert.
Educating lawyers about these
CONCLUSION
The examples presented attempt to 
provide guidance and practical use 
of regression analysis and the market 
approach . This analysis is easily 
accomplished with many statistical 
software packages in addition to add­
on modules to most of the popular 
spreadsheet programs. The overview 
in this article also makes the reader 
aware that, when considering  a 
regression model, there may not be 
a one-size-fits-all model that possibly 
varies based upon the industry. In 
the end, this k ind of analysis 
removes the subjectivity associated 
with simply applying an average of 
the analysts preferred ratio to the 
subject company.
James A. DiGabriele, DPS, CPA, is manag­
ing partner of DiGabriele, McNulty & Co. 
LLC (www.dmcpa.com) in West Orange, 
NJ. He is also assistant professor in the 
Accounting Department of Montclair State 
University, Montclair, NJ. He can be con­
tacted at jim@dmcpa.com.
issues can be difficult sometimes. 
However, a resource that might help 
expert witnesses advise lawyers—and 
make very clear their expectations 
concerning their role as experts—is 
available in an online publication 
directed at lawyers. The resource 
also offers experts some guidance in 
assessing how well a lawyer would 
work with them.
In a Law.com article, “Working
With an Expert Witness: The Seven 
Deadly Sins” (April 12, 2006), 
Gabrielle Bonne suggests to lawyers 
that if they commit too many of the 
sins they “can sabotage [their] 
chances of getting the best results.” 
She also advises “never lose sight of 
your expert witnesses—they can 
make or break your case.”
H ere ’s Ms. B onne’s list. Some 
items in the list may be self-explana­
tory. For more detail, however, access 
her article at www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticle- 
Friendlyjsp?id=l 144760096580.
1. “Wait until the last m inute [to 
engage an expert].
2. Hire the first person who tells you
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what you want to hear.
3. Go bargain basement.
4. Provide inadequate information.
5. Ask them to back up crazy theo­
ries.
6. Ignore differences between legal 
stipulation and scientific truth.
Act unethically and ask them to 
do so, as well.”
UNREALISTIC OBJECTIVES 
AND DEADLINES FOSTER 
UNETHICAL CORPORATE 
BEHAVIOR
Management or board pressure to 
meet unrealistic business objectives 
and deadlines is the leading cause of 
unethical corporate behavior. The 
factors placing second and third are 
the desire to further one’s career and 
to protect one’s livelihood. These are 
findings of a global survey commis­
sioned by the American Management 
Association (AMA) and conducted by 
the Human Resource Institute (HRI). 
The survey on “The Ethical Enter­
prise” included responses from 1,121 
m anagers and HR experts from 
around the world.
The next leading factors likely to 
cause unethical behavior are, in 
order:
• Working in an environment with 
cynicism or diminished morale
• Improper training about or igno­
rance that acts are unethical
• Lack of consequences when 
caught
• The need to follow the boss’s 
orders
• Peer pressure/desire to be a team 
player
• Desire to steal from or harm the 
organization
• Paradoxically, wanting to help the 
organization survive
How can com panies com bat 
unethical behavior? By establishing 
policies and processes for an ethical 
culture. For more information about 
the survey and its recommendations 
for establishing such policies and 
processes visit www.amanet.org.
OVERVIEW OF THE NEW 
TAX LAW
To help practitioners in adopting and 
managing the provisions of new tax 
legislation, the Deloitte Tax Team has 
authored Pressing Ahead: The Tax 
Increase Prevention and Reconciliation 
Act of 2005, an overview and analysis 
of the legislation. This document:
• Gives an overview of the tax law’s 
m ajor provisions, includ ing  
changes to capital gains and divi­
dends taxation, the AMT, and 
potentially significant benefits to 
high-income individuals who will 
be perm itted  to convert trad i­
tional IRAs to Roth IRAs in 2010.
• Outlines the revenue-raisers that 
offset the legislation’s cost, includ-
CPA Experts Providing Hot
Services
Services provided by CPA experts 
were very high on the list of niche 
services that Accounting Today's 
T 100 firms were increasing their 
business in. Forensics/fraud and 
litigation  support, each a t 76%  
were among the services with the 
h ig h es t p e rc e n ta g e  of firm s  
increasing their businesses. Attest 
services, international ta x , and 
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance were 
also at 76%.
Next in percentage rank was busi­
ness valuations at 72%, tied with 
es ta te /tru s t/g ift tax planning.
ing the repeal of FSC/ETI (for­
eign sales corporation/extraterri­
torial income) binding contract 
relief provisions and new modifi­
cations to the Section 199 wage 
limitation.
• Identifies com m on issues and 
opportunities that business tax­
payers may encounter; and out­
lines the effective dates for the 
provision’s phase in and phase 
out period.
Deloitte’s overview of the new tax 
law, Pressing Ahead: The Tax Increase 
Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 
2005 is free and available at 
www.deloitte.com/dtt/article /0 ,1 0 0 2 ,s id = 1 10854& 
cid=118641;00.html. X
IS YOUR FIRM READY FOR THE AVIAN 
FLU PANDEMIC? SHOULD IT BE?
At the beginning of 2006, the Gart­
ner Group, the information technol­
ogy consulting and research firm, 
predicted that the avian influenza 
pandemic is highly likely and could 
cause devastating loss of life and eco­
nomic effects. To support its predic­
tion, Gartner cited the World Health 
Organization’s (WHO’s) prediction 
that a pandemic is “almost certain”
and the C ongressional Budget 
Office’s prediction that the pan­
demic will have “devastating eco­
nom ic consequences,” G artner 
advises organizations to take imme­
diate action to prepare for the out­
break and have response plans in 
place by mid-2006.
Daily, we read or hear another 
piece of news about the avian flu or
bird flu. The virus has spread to bird 
populations throughout Asia, the 
Middle East, and Europe. As well as 
m igratory birds, chickens, and 
ducks, it has infected humans who 
were exposed to waste from infected 
birds. The U.S. media has not cov­
ered these events with the drama 
and hyperbole they often use for 
such devastating disasters as hurri­
canes, floods, and forest fires. Still 
experts do not doubt that it will hap­
pen. The question in their minds is 
when will it happen.
A pandemic differs from other
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natural disasters and public health 
em ergencies. After those events 
strike and subside, victims work 
toward recovery. Typical pandemics 
follow a different pattern, however, 
and although business continuity 
planning is still needed, planners 
need to be aware of these differences 
and their impact on their business, 
their clients and customers, their 
suppliers, and their employees. Since 
a pandemic is widespread, for exam­
ple, sending employees to or using 
employees at other locations may 
not be possible. In the Fulton County 
Daily Report (May 4, 2006), Thomas 
William Baker and Katherine H. 
Forseth cite the many issues that 
business owners will need to address: 
absenteeism, productivity, telecom­
m unications capability, infection 
control education, financial plan­
ning, decreased—or increased  
demand for services, temporary clos­
ing, and perhaps mandatory closing, 
and supply chain interruptions.
BV Standards Update
Here's a message from Mike Crain, chair of the AICPA Business 
Valuation Committee, on the status of the proposed business val­
uation standard.
By the time you read this, another draft of the revised business valuation standard 
may be exposed. If not, the latest exposure draft is expected to be issued this Sum­
mer. As you may know, the public exposure of the proposed valuation standard last 
year resulted in approximately 160 comment letters. A task force of the Business 
Valuation Committee reviewed all of the comments and had discussions with several 
practice groups in the AICPA. As a result of the comment letters and discussions, 
the task force has made changes to the proposed standard.
BUSINESS CONTINUITY CHECKLIST
What makes preparing for a flu pan­
demic difficult is its unpredictability. 
The experts predict it will happen, 
but no one can predict precisely how 
and when. Baker and Forseth say 
such pandemics come in waves and 
the intervals may be weeks or 
m onths or even longer. Conse­
quently, plans require great flexibil­
ity.
To help businesses and individu­
als plan to deal with the pandemic, 
the Center for Disease Control offers 
a checklist for developing a plan, 
which is on the CDC’s Web site at 
pandemicflu.gov/plan/businesschecklist.html.
Another source of useful informa­
tion about business continuity plan­
ning is the “criticality assessment 
m atrix” at www.continuitycentml.com/feature 
0261.htm. X
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